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Abstract	
This	article	provides	a	reflexive	account	on	criminological	engagement	with	crimes	of	states,	
with	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Nazi	 Germany	 and	 the	 Holocaust,	 and	 Berlin	 and	
Germany	today.	The	emergence	of	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states	is	reviewed,	along	with	
arguments	 for	 and	 against	 criminological	 engagement	 with	 such	 crime.	 In	 particular,	 a	
response	to	Carrier	and	Park’s	(2013)	critique	of	‘entrepreneurial	criminology’	is	provided	in	
this	context.	Distinctions	are	drawn	between	monumental	and	mundane	crimes	of	states,	and	
mislabeled	 and	 miscalculated	 crimes	 of	 states,	 with	 special	 attention	 to	 mundane	 and	
miscalculated	crimes.	A	brief	concluding	section	identifies	some	issues	that	might	be	included	
in	an	agenda	for	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states,	going	forward.	
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Dedication	
This	article	is	dedicated	to	the	memory	of	William	J	Chambliss,	who	died	in	2014,	and	A	Kathryn	
(Kate)	 Stout,	who	died	 in	2015.	Over	 a	period	of	 some	 fifty	 years	Bill	was	a	 leading	 figure	 in	
conflict	and	radical	criminology	and	the	author	of	countless	landmark	books	and	articles	in	the	
field.	 He	 is	 remembered	 fondly	 for	 his	 personal	 warmth,	 his	 convivial	 company,	 and	 his	
inspiring	 leadership	 in	 criminological	 engagement	 with	 the	 core	 issues	 of	 crime,	 justice	 and	
social	democracy.	Kate	 completed	a	PhD	dissertation	on	 the	 sanctuary	movement	with	Bill	 at	
the	University	of	Delaware	and	co‐edited	an	anthology	on	social	problems,	law	and	society	with	
him	 and	 RA	 Dello	 Buono.	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 more	 than	 thirty	 years	 Kate	 taught	 at	 various	
colleges	and	universities.	She	is	remembered	fondly	for	her	sparkling	personality,	her	lively	wit,	
and	 her	 passionate	 pedagogical	 engagement	 with	 the	 core	 issues	 of	 crime,	 justice	 and	 social	
democracy.	
	
Criminology	and	crimes	of	states:	A	reflexive	account	
The	question	of	why	criminologists	choose	to	adopt	a	particular	specialized	focus	in	the	field	has	
always	 seemed	 interesting	 to	 me.	 In	 many	 cases,	 surely,	 this	 specialized	 focus	 reflects	 the	
influence	 of	 a	 key	mentor	or	 a	 course	 taken	 that	 greatly	 engaged	one’s	 attention.	 It	may	 also	
David	O	Friedrichs:	Rethinking	the	Criminology	of	Crimes	of	States	
IJCJ&SD									107	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2015	4(4)	
reflect	 pragmatic	 or	 strategic	 assessments	 of	what	 kind	 of	 specialized	 focus	 is	most	 likely	 to	
maximize	 job	 opportunities	 and	 advancement,	 and	 is	 most	 likely	 to	 receive	 grant‐related	
funding.	 For	 some,	 serendipitous	 circumstances	 may	 be	 critical:	 for	 example,	 an	 unexpected	
invitation	to	join	a	project	that	then	leads	to	a	specialized	focus.	Some	thirty‐five	years	ago,	at	an	
Urban	 Crime	 Conference	 in	 Philadelphia,	 I	 presented	 a	 paper	 (subsequently	 published)	 ‘The	
Problem	 of	 Reconciling	 Divergent	 Perspectives	 on	 Urban	 Crime:	 Personal	 Experience,	 Social	
Ideology	and	Scholarly	Research’	(Friedrichs	1981).	I	proposed	that	we	come	at	criminological	
topics	experientially	and	ideologically,	prior	to	encountering	a	scholarly	literature	on	crime	and	
its	control.	More	specifically,	both	our	perspective	on	and	 interest	 in	particular	criminological	
topics	 can	 be	 shaped	 by	 direct	 experience	 (for	 example,	 as	 a	 victim	 of	 a	 particular	 form	 of	
crime),	as	well	as	vicarious	experience	(that	is,	the	experience	of	family	members	or	friends,	and	
then	the	pervasive	exposure	to	representations	of	crime	and	its	control	in	the	media).		
	
We	also	bring	ideology	to	our	study	of	crime:	for	example,	religious	beliefs	(or	non‐beliefs)	and	
political	 convictions	 (or	 an	 apolitical	 orientation).	 When	 we	 first	 encounter	 the	 scholarly	
literature	on	crime	and	its	control	we	are	 likely	to	engage	with	 it	 through	an	experiential	and	
ideological	prism,	and	this	prism	in	turn	is	quite	likely	to	influence	the	choices	of	which	parts	of	
the	 vast	 criminological	 scholarly	 literature	 one	 chooses	 to	 engage	with.	 However,	 one	 of	 the	
themes	 of	 my	 original	 paper	 (and	 article)	 on	 this	 topic	 is	 this:	 we	 cannot	 always	 so	 easily	
reconcile	 how	we	 come	 at	 a	 criminological	 topic	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 experiential,	 ideological,	 and	
scholarly	engagement	with	it.		
	
The	very	way	that	crime	is	legally	defined	has	disproportionately	directed	people’s	attention	to	
crimes	 of	 the	 powerless,	 as	 opposed	 to	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful,	 and	 this	 disproportionate	
attention	remains	reflected	within	the	discipline	of	criminology	itself	(Friedrichs	2015).	My	own	
original	 criminological	 focus	 was	 on	 juvenile	 delinquents,	 who	 exemplify	 crimes	 of	 the	
powerless.	 The	 first	 criminology	 course	 I	 took	 as	 an	 undergraduate,	 in	 1964,	 was	 Juvenile	
Delinquency.	 I	 spent	 the	 summers	 of	 1965	 and	 1967	working	 in	 a	 famous	 reform	 school	 for	
juvenile	 delinquents,	 Warwick	 State	 Training	 School	 in	 Orange	 County,	 New	 York.	 My	 first	
attempt	at	a	Master’s	thesis	compared	boys	who	‘breezed’	(ran	away)	from	the	training	school	
with	those	who	did	not,	on	a	number	of	different	variables.		
	
But	 I	 regard	 the	 period	 between	 1964	 and	 1974	 as	 the	 formative	 period	 in	my	 identity	 and	
orientation	 as	 a	 criminologist,	 and	 various	 experiences	 during	 this	 period	 led	 to	 a	 shift	 of	
interest	 from	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerless	 to	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful.	 In	 October,	 1964,	 I	
participated	in	the	Freedom	Vote	in	Greenville,	Mississippi,	an	unforgettable	experience	for	me.	
I	recall	distinctly	the	epiphany	I	had	traveling	from	Jackson,	Mississippi,	to	Greenville,	 in	a	car	
with	a	California	license	plate,	filled	with	white	and	black	civil	rights	workers,	and	experiencing	
a	 sense	 of	 fear	 when	 we	 encountered	 a	 state	 police	 car.	 The	 bodies	 of	 the	 three	 civil	 rights	
workers	killed	in	Mississippi	had	been	found	only	two	months	earlier;	it	was	well‐known	within	
the	civil	rights	community	that	white	Mississippi	enforcement	officers	had	participated	in	these	
murders.	As	a	white	Northerner	and	resident	of	an	upper	middle	class	neighborhood,	I	had	until	
then	 the	 typical	 view	 of	 my	 peers:	 that	 is,	 as	 long	 as	 I	 was	 complying	 with	 the	 law,	 the	
(predominantly	white)	 police	would	 leave	me	alone.	But	here	 in	Mississippi	 I	 had	 to	 fear	 the	
police	despite	not	violating	any	 laws.	And	of	 course	 the	whole	 situation	 in	Mississippi	at	 that	
time	–	where	I	witnessed	the	vestiges	of	 formal	segregation	(‘Colored	Waiting	Room’)	and	the	
systemic	disenfranchisement	of	black	citizens	of	the	state,	who	made	up	over	40	per	cent	of	the	
population	but	only	 about	2	per	 cent	 of	 the	voters	 –	 impressed	on	me	 the	 significance	of	 the	
crimes	 committed	 by	 white‐controlled	 states	 against	 African‐Americans	 through	 the	
perpetuation	of	a	Jim	Crow	regime	of	systemic	oppression	and	denial	of	basic	human	rights.		
	
Then	the	following	year,	in	1965,	I	participated	for	the	first	time	in	one	of	the	anti‐Vietnam	War	
marches,	the	first	of	many	such	demonstrations	into	1973.	By	1965	I	had	come	to	the	conclusion	
that	 the	American	pursuit	of	war	 in	Vietnam	was	a	 fundamentally	criminal	enterprise,	a	view	
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that	many	other	Americans	had	adopted	by	that	time,	and	that	I	have	never	had	any	reason	to	
abandon	 in	 the	half	 century	 since	 that	 time.	Here	 again	was	a	potent	 lesson	 that	 some	of	 the	
most	consequential	crimes	are	carried	out	by	the	political	and	military	leadership,	in	the	name	
of	the	country	as	a	whole.		
	
In	 1966	 I	 walked	 out	 of	 my	 New	 York	 University	 commencement,	 along	 with	 many	 fellow	
students	and	some	professors,	when	we	 learned	 that	Robert	McNamara,	Secretary	of	Defense	
and	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 architects	 of	 the	 Vietnam	 War,	 would	 be	 receiving	 an	 honorary	
doctorate.	 McNamara	 (1995),	 in	 the	memoir	 he	 published	 near	 the	 end	 of	 his	 life,	 famously	
conceded	‘We	were	wrong,’	but	even	though	he	acknowledges	he	knew	this	by	the	mid‐1960s	he	
certainly	didn’t	make	any	public	declarations	to	that	effect	at	that	time.	And	in	relation	to	major	
political	developments,	of	course	the	period	1972‐1974	was	witness	to	the	unfolding	drama	of	
the	 Watergate	 Affair,	 leading	 to	 the	 only	 resignation	 of	 an	 American	 President	 to	 date.	 The	
Watergate	Affair,	which	I	followed	with	avid	interest,	was	another	potent	lesson	in	the	breadth	
and	significance	of	crimes	carried	out	by	and	on	behalf	of	the	most	powerful	American,	at	that	
time,	the	leader	of	the	‘Free	World.’	I	recall	marching	at	President	Nixon’s	second	inauguration	
in	1973	carrying	a	sign	saying	‘Indict,	don’t	Inaugurate.’		
	
There	 were	 other	 personal	 experiences	 as	 well	 as	 developments	 in	 the	 larger	 society	 that	
contributed	to	an	increasing	consciousness	of	crimes	of	the	powerful,	in	relation	to	crimes	of	the	
powerless.	As	 is	well‐known,	 ‘The	Sixties’	–	especially	 the	period	 from	the	 late	1960s	 into	 the	
early	1970s	–	was	characterized	by	the	increasing	visibility	of	radical	and	neo‐Marxist	critiques	
of	the	established	order.	It	was	also	a	period	when	other	forces	in	American	society	–	including	
the	 relative	 prosperity	 and	 economic	 growth	 of	 this	 period	 –	 were	 giving	 rise	 to	 expanding	
concern	about	practices	and	policies	of	powerful	 corporations	that	 impacted	on	the	quality	of	
life	–	and	in	some	cases,	life	itself.	So	an	emerging	Consumer	Movement	(spurred	especially	by	
the	initiatives	of	Ralph	Nader)	and	an	Environmental	Movement	also	reinforced	the	theme	that	
much	significant	harm	emanates	from	the	powerful,	not	the	powerless.	Altogether,	a	confluence	
of	 circumstances	 in	 American	 society	 promoted	 growing	 recognition	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 and	
crimes	of	corporations.	
	
Crimes	of	states	and	the	singular	case	of	post‐World	War	II	Germany	
I	 accepted	 an	 invitation	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 State	 Crime	Workshop	 at	 the	 Freie	 Universitat	 in	
Berlin	in	February,	2015,	in	part	due	to	the	irresistible	opportunity	to	explore	crimes	of	states	in	
the	capital	where	one	of	history’s	most	famous	–	perhaps	the	most	famous	–	crime	of	state	was	
planned,	in	a	country	from	which	my	own	parents	fled	in	the	late	1930s	as	refugees	from	Nazi	
Germany.	It	is	now	quite	well‐known,	and	many	books	have	explored	the	topic,	that	for	several	
decades	following	the	end	of	World	War	II	Germany	and	the	German	people	were	 largely	 in	a	
state	of	denial	about	 their	 responsibility	 for	 the	monumental	 crimes	 that	occurred	during	 the	
Nazi	era.	Many	Germans	rejected	the	legitimacy	of	the	Nuremberg	trials,	seeing	them	principally	
as	 instances	 of	 victor’s	 justice.	 Large	 numbers	 of	 former	 Nazis	 were	 re‐absorbed	 into	 the	
German	political	system	as	well	as	the	judiciary.	And	then	of	course	we	have	the	systemic	post‐
World	War	 II	crimes	committed	 in	East	Germany,	with	 the	 infamous	Stasi	 secret	police	at	 the	
center	of	this.	But	since	the	late	1970s	in	particular,	Germany	has	collectively	acknowledged	and	
commemorated	the	Holocaust	and	the	monumental	crimes	of	the	Nazis.	Avi	Primor,	the	former	
Israeli	 Ambassador	 to	 Germany,	 at	 an	 event	 commemorating	 the	 liberation	 of	 Auschwitz,	 in	
Erfurt,	Germany,	on	January	25,	2008,	observed:	‘Where	in	the	world	has	one	ever	seen	a	nation	
that	erects	memorials	to	immortalize	its	own	shame?	Only	the	Germans	had	the	bravery	and	the	
humility’	(in	Kulish	2008:	A1).		
	
While	in	Berlin	for	the	State	Crime	Workshop	at	the	Freie	Universitat,	during	the	week	of	9‐13	
February,	I	visited	the	Memorial	to	the	Murdered	Jews	of	Europe	–	in	the	heart	of	the	city	–	and	
the	 Topography	 of	 Terror	 Museum,	 focused	 on	 the	 perpetrators,	 just	 two	 such	 sites	
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acknowledging	the	crimes	of	the	Nazis.	The	Germany	of	today	may	be	resented	and	envied	by	
some	–	currently,	for	example,	by	many	Greeks	due	to	its	role	in	imposing	austerity	policies	in	
Greece	 –	 and	 issues	 have	 arisen	 as	 they	 have	 in	 many	 countries	 about	 its	 treatment	 of	
immigrants,	but	it	is	not	generally	viewed	as	a	criminal	state.	Indeed,	we	are	confronted	with	a	
tragic	 paradox	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 World	 War	 II.	 Nazi	 Germany	 is	 widely	 regarded	 as	 history’s	
paradigmatic	case	of	a	criminal	state.	But	since	World	War	II	many	other	countries	–	including	
the	United	States	–	have	been	far	more	complicit	in	crimes	of	states,	by	any	measure,	than	has	
been	the	case	of	Germany	(or,	through	1989,	what	was	West	Germany).	And	then	we	have	the	
case	of	Israel,	which	came	into	being	due	to	the	Holocaust.	It	seems	indisputable	that	far	more	
people	in	the	world	today	–	millions,	surely	–	regard	Israel	as	a	criminal	state,	however	unfair	
this	characterization	may	be.	This	is	especially	true	in	the	wake	of	recent	Israeli	actions	in	Gaza,	
and	is	reflected	in	a	disturbing	worldwide	resurgence	of	anti‐Semitism.		
	
Berlin	 in	February,	2015	–	almost	seventy	years	after	 the	fall	of	Nazi	Germany	and	the	end	of	
World	War	II	–	was	an	especially	appropriate	setting	for	a	State	Crime	Workshop.	The	city	was	
at	the	heart	of	the	Nazi	criminal	state,	and	has	been	for	more	than	twenty	years	the	capital	of	a	
country	that	has	dramatically	repudiated	this	criminal	enterprise.	Berlin,	then,	is	an	appropriate	
setting	 for	 exploring	 the	 emergence	 of	 state	 crime	 and	 mass	 political	 violence.	 It	 is	 also	 an	
appropriate	setting	for	exploring	the	transition	to	a	post‐state	crime	society.	Ideally	–	without	
suggesting	that	Germany	is	some	sort	of	 ideal	modern	state	or	society	–	it	seems	much	can	be	
learned	from	Germany’s	basically	redemptive	course	in	the	wake	of	the	Third	Reich	era.	
	
A	criminology	of	crimes	of	states:	Its	origins	and	current	status	
Within	 criminology	 as	 a	 whole,	 even	 today,	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 is	 a	 marginal	
enterprise.	 I	will	 here	 invoke	my	 ‘inverse	 hypothesis’	 of	 criminological	 concerns:	 the	 level	 of	
attention	accorded	by	criminology	to	a	form	of	crime	varies	inversely	with	the	degree	of	harm	
caused	 by	 the	 form	 of	 crime.	 Yes,	 this	 claim	 is	 somewhat	 exaggerated,	 but	 I	 believe	 the	 core	
substance	of	it	is	correct.	And	for	most	of	its	history	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states	has	been	a	
wholly	 invisible	 phenomenon.	 A	 French	 judge,	 Louis	 Proal	 (1898)	 produced	 a	 book,	Political	
Crime,	that	drew	attention	to	the	crimes	of	the	political	leadership	class,	but	this	book	–	despite	
being	 published	 in	 English	 in	 a	 series	 that	 included	 a	 work	 of	 Cesare	 Lombroso’s	 –	 had	 no	
identifiable	impact	on	the	field	of	criminology	through	the	course	of	the	twentieth	century.	We	
can	 find	 some	 other	 instances	 of	 prominent	 American	 criminologists	 –	 for	 example	 Sheldon	
Glueck	and	Donald	Taft	–	who	published	on	international	criminal	justice	and	crimes	of	war,	in	
the	 period	 immediately	 following	 World	 War	 II,	 but	 again	 this	 work	 had	 no	 measurable	
influence	 on	 criminology	 as	 a	 field	 of	 study	 in	 the	 decades	 that	 followed	 (Friedrichs	 2010).	
These	criminologists	might	be	characterized	as	progenitors	of	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states.		
	
Then	we	have	a	small	number	of	criminologists	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	–	principally	associated	
with	conflict,	 radical	or	critical	criminology	–	who	produced	work	that	 laid	a	 foundation	for	a	
criminology	of	crimes	of	states.	These	criminologists	included	Herman	Schwendinger	and	Julia	
Schwendinger	 (1970)	 in	 their	 call	 for	 a	 reconceptualization	 of	 crime	 in	 terms	 of	 identifiable	
harm,	Austin	Turk	(1982)	on	‘political	policing,’	and	Stanley	Cohen	(2001)	on	a	criminology	of	
human	 rights	 violations	 and	 on	 ‘states	 of	 denial.’	 However,	 I	 regard	 William	 J	 Chambliss’s	
(1989)	 American	 Society	 of	 Criminology	 Presidential	 Address	 of	 1988,	 on	 ‘state‐organized	
crime’,	as	 the	basic	seminal	contribution	establishing	a	contemporary	criminology	of	 states	of	
crime.	Chambliss,	as	well	as	Stanley	Cohen,	Austin	Turk	and	a	 few	others,	are	then	part	of	the	
first	generation	of	criminologists	of	state	crime;	 they	were	born	between	the	early	1930s	and	
early	 1940s.	 Some	 critical	 criminologists	 born	 largely	 between	 the	 mid‐1940s	 and	 the	 mid‐
1950s,	who	took	up	attention	to	crimes	of	states	from	the	latter	1980s	forward,	and	who	were	
either	 students	 of	 or	 were	 importantly	 influenced	 by	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 state	 crime	
criminologists,	 include	 Gregg	 Barak,	 Peter	 Iadicola,	 Ronald	 Kramer,	 Raymond	 Michalowski,	
Wayne	Morrison,	 Jeffrey	Ross	and	myself.	Gregg	Barak’s	 (1991)	Crime	by	 the	Capitalist	State	 ,	
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Jeffrey	 Ian	Ross’s	 (1995)	Controlling	State	Crime	and	David	 Friedrichs’s	 (1998)	State	Crime	–	
Volumes	 I	 &	 II,	 were	 three	 initiatives	 by	 criminologists	 of	 this	 generation,	 in	 the	 1990s,	 to	
produce	anthologies	on	state	crime.		
	
Some	 mainstream	 criminologists,	 roughly	 part	 of	 this	 generational	 cohort,	 began	 to	 take	 up	
significant	attention	to	crimes	of	states	in	the	new	century,	including	Augustine	Brannigan,	John	
Hagan	and	Joachim	Savelsberg.	In	the	first	decade	of	the	new	century	two	significant	attempts	to	
map	 the	 terrain	 of	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	were	 published:	 Penny	 Green	 and	 Tony	
Ward’s	 (2004)	State	Crime	and	Dawn	L	Rothe’s	 (2009)	State	Criminality.	These	criminologists	
have	been	active	contributors	 to	 the	criminology	of	state	crime	 literature.	We	also	have	some	
significant	 anthologies	 published	 during	 this	 period,	 including	 William	 Chambliss,	 Raymond	
Michalowski	and	Ronald	C	Kramer’s	(2010)	State	Crime	 in	the	Global	Age,	Alette	Smeulers	and	
Roelof	Haveman’s	(2008)	Supranational	Criminology	and	Dawn	Rothe	and	Christopher	Mullins’s	
(2011)	State	Crime:	Current	Perspectives.	The	most	recent	anthology	is	four	volumes:	William	J	
Chambliss	and	Christopher	Moloney’s	(2015)	State	Crime.		
	
Altogether,	we	now	have	what	might	be	characterized	as	a	third	generation	(limiting	this	listing	
to	 Americans	 only),	 a	 rapidly	 expanding	 group	 of	 younger	 criminologists	 (born	 after	 1960),	
some	being	former	students	of	the	second	generation	(especially	of	Ron	Kramer)	that	includes	
but	is	hardly	limited	to	David	Kauzlarich,	Dawn	Rothe,	Rick	Matthews,	Alex	Alvarez,	Christopher	
Mullins,	 Emily	 Lenning,	 Victoria	 Collins,	 Elizabeth	 Bradshaw,	 and	 many	 others.	 Two	
criminological	 journals	 –	War	Crimes,	Genocide	&	Crimes	Against	Humanity	and	 State	Crime	 –	
now	 focus	 on	 crimes	 of	 states,	 and	 state	 crime	 scholarship	 is	 increasingly	 being	published	 in	
such	journals	as	Social	 Justice,	Crime,	Law	&	Social	Change,	Critical	Criminology	and	the	British	
Journal	of	Criminology.	Two	consortiums	have	been	established	–	one	based	at	King’s	College	in	
London	 and	 one	 based	 at	 Old	 Dominican	 University	 in	 Norfolk.	 A	 newsletter,	 Criminology	&	
International	Crimes,	published	at	VU	(Vrei	Univesitat	 in	Amsterdam)	appears	quite	 regularly.	
Symposia	and	workshops	have	been	held	in	increasing	number,	especially	since	2006.	Sessions	
devoted	to	crimes	of	states	are	a	regular	part	of	the	criminology	conferences,	including	a	well‐
attended,	 annual	 State	 Crime	 Roundtable	 at	 the	 American	 Society	 of	 Criminology	 meeting.	
Altogether,	we	are	now	seeing	a	proliferation	of	books,	articles	and	conference	papers	focusing	
on	various	dimensions	of	crimes	of	states.	And	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states	is	increasingly	
acknowledged	in	criminology	textbooks.	In	sum,	in	the	middle	of	the	second	decade	of	the	new	
century,	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 is	 a	 well‐established,	 if	 still	 somewhat	 marginal,	
specialized	area	of	inquiry	within	criminology.	
	
Arguments	for	and	against	criminological	engagement	with	crimes	of	states	
The	 great	majority	of	 criminologists	do	not	 criticize	a	 criminology	of	 crimes	of	 states;	 rather,	
they	 simply	 ignore	 this	 strain	of	 criminological	 inquiry.	The	 implicit	 if	 not	 explicit	 critique	 of	
such	 criminological	 inquiry	 presumably	 encompasses	 the	 following	 considerations:	 No	 one	
could	 seriously	 deny	 that	 vast	 harms	 have	 been	 perpetrated	 in	 the	 name	 of	 states,	 but	 such	
harm	is	in	the	domain	of	international	law,	international	relations,	and	political	science,	and	is	
not	usefully	characterized	as	a	criminological	phenomenon.	Nor	is	it	denied	that	the	term	‘crime’	
has	 been	 applied	 to	 at	 least	 some	manifestations	 of	 such	 harm,	 but	 criminological	 inquiry	 is	
most	 appropriately	 and	 most	 fruitfully	 restricted	 to	 conventional	 violations	 of	 criminal	 law.	
Criminological	theories	and	methods	were	developed	to	explain	and	investigate	such	crime,	not	
crimes	 of	 states.	 Criminologists	 have	 more	 than	 enough	 to	 occupy	 themselves	 with	 the	
examination	 of	 conventional	 crime	 and	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 response	 to	 such	 crime	
without	engaging	with	the	hugely	complex	issues	generated	by	crimes	of	states.	Criminologists	
are	 most	 likely	 to	 have	 some	 influence	 on	 public	 policy	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 restrict	
themselves	to	the	conventional	forms	of	crime	and	the	control	of	such	crime.	
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The	principal	explicit	or	implicit	arguments	in	favor	of	a	criminology	of	state	crimes	encompass	
the	following	general	themes.	First,	the	crimes	of	states	are	by	any	reasonable	measure	the	most	
consequential	of	all	crimes	–	the	 ‘crime	of	crimes’	–	and	it	 is	 inherently	absurd	for	the	field	of	
criminology	 to	 fail	 to	 attend	 to	 such	 crimes.	 Second,	 criminologists,	 with	 their	 thorough	
familiarity	with	the	issues	relating	to	conceptualizing	crime	and	its	control	as	well	as	what	has	
been	learned	about	such	crime	and	its	control,	should	have	something	of	value	to	contribute	to	
the	understanding	of	crimes	of	states	and	the	control	of	such	crime.	With	regard	to	conventional	
crime	and	its	control	we	may	well	have	embarked	on	an	era	of	diminishing	returns,	in	the	sense	
that	these	forms	of	crime	and	social	control	have	now	been	so	thoroughly	studied	that	it	is	far	
from	clear	 that	 further	 study	can	greatly	advance	our	understanding	 in	 this	 realm,	and	 in	 the	
case	of	conventional	crime	it	is	a	substantially	diminished	social	problem	relative	to	what	was	
the	 case	 in	 an	earlier	 time.	Any	 impact	of	mainstream	criminological	 research	on	 the	 societal	
response	to	crime	has	been	largely	trumped	by	political	considerations.		
	
Third,	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states	ideally	can	be	part	of	a	critical	mass	of	interdisciplinary	
scholarship	 on	 such	 crime	 and	 at	 least	 in	 some	 circumstances	 could	 contribute	 to	 broader	
cultural	 awareness	of	and	effective	preventive	 social	 action	strategies	 in	 relation	 to	 crimes	of	
states.	Finally	and	above	all,	what	is	at	stake	in	understanding	and	at	least	constraining	–	if	not	
obliterating	–	crimes	of	states	is	so	hugely	consequential	that	we	are	morally	obliged	to	engage	
fully	with	the	challenges	of	understanding	and	responding	more	effectively	to	the	threat	of	such	
crimes,	however	challenging	that	may	be.	
	
Responding	to	a	critique	of	‘entrepreneurial	criminology’	
Two	 Canadian	 criminologists,	 Nicholas	 Carrier	 and	 Augustine	 SJ	 Park	 (2013),	 have	 now	
produced	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states,	 which	 they	 characterize	 as	 ‘an	
entrepreneurial	criminology	of	mass	political	violence’.	Since	this	is	a	relatively	rare	instance	of	
a	 full‐fledged	 critical	 engagement	 with	 this	 emerging	 enterprise	 it	 seems	 worthy	 of	 some	
attention,	especially	as	in	my	view	it	wholly	misrepresents	the	core	themes	and	analytical	thrust	
of	 this	enterprise.	Carrier	and	Park	 (2013:	298)	begin	with	 the	assertion	 that	entrepreneurial	
criminology	claims	a	‘singular	mastery’	of	mass	political	violence.	But	who	makes	such	a	claim?	
In	my	reading	those	who	engage	 in	 this	endeavor	seek	to	gain	recognition	that	criminological	
analysis	can	legitimately	contribute	to	an	interdisciplinary	endeavor	on	crimes	of	mass	political	
violence.	The	claim	that	entrepreneurial	criminology	attempts	to	reduce	the	complexity	of	such	
violence	 seems	 equally	 misplaced	 in	 my	 view.	 Rather,	 it	 seeks	 to	 graft	 a	 criminological	
dimension	onto	the	analysis	of	an	undeniably	and	endlessly	complex	phenomenon.	The	claim	is	
then	made	 that	 entrepreneurial	 criminologists	 don’t	 differentiate	 between	 the	Holocaust	 and	
white	collar	crime.	To	the	extent	that	such	criminologists	address	both	topics,	it	would	be	good	
to	 know	 where	 this	 might	 be	 so.	 I	 have	 specifically	 addressed	 the	 fundamental	 differences	
between	 the	crimes	of	 the	Nazis	and	 the	crimes	of	 corporations	(Friedrichs	1996).	And	while	
the	differences	are	pronounced	some	parallel	dimensions	also	require	our	attention.	
	
Carrier	and	Park	(2013:	306)	claim	that	entrepreneurial	criminologists	graft	on	knowledge	of	
ordinary	crime	to	mass	political	violence.	In	my	reading	it	is	far	more	accurate	to	say	that	they	
apply	 that	 knowledge	 comparatively.	 Does	 entrepreneurial	 criminology	 fail	 to	 question	
criminalization,	 as	 Carrier	 and	 Park	 (2013:	 306)	 claim?	 Rather,	 it	 seems	 to	me,	 it	 challenges	
orthodox	 conceptions	 of	 criminalization.	 For	 Carrier	 and	 Park	 (2013:	 309)	 entrepreneurial	
criminology	 reduces	political	 actors	 to	 ‘mere	 criminals’	 and	 de‐politicizes	 political	 conflict.	 In	
my	 reading	 what	 this	 enterprise	 actually	 stresses	 is	 that	 mass	 political	 violence	 should	 be	
interpreted	as	a	 criminal	as	well	 as	a	political	phenomenon.	A	purely	 ‘political’	 interpretation	
evades	the	criminality	inherent	in	such	violence.	
	
Finally,	Carrier	and	Park	(2013:	310)	claim	that	an	entrepreneurial	criminology	contributes	to	
the	 perpetuation	 of	 a	 global	 North	 hegemony.	 It	 is	 true	 enough	 that	 criminology	 itself	 as	 a	
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discipline	 is	 a	predominantly	Western	 (or	 global	North)	product,	 and	 those	who	 are	 engaged	
with	 an	 ‘entrepreneurial	 criminology’	 are	 not	 necessarily	 entirely	 free	 of	 a	 Westernized	
perspective	and	attendant	biases.	It	is	always	important	to	be	mindful	of	this,	and	to	attend	as	
fully	 as	possible	 to	 ‘global	 South’	 and	non‐Western	perspectives	 and	 frameworks.	But	Carrier	
and	Park	seem	to	be	suggesting	that	entrepreneurial	criminologists	operating	out	of	the	global	
North	 are	 unqualified	 to	 pass	 judgment	 on	 mass	 political	 violence	 and	 a	 whole	 range	 of	
atrocities	 or	 grossly	 corrupt	 activities.	 Such	moral	 ‘neutrality’	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 complicit	 in	 on‐
going	gross	violation	of	human	rights,	broadly	conceived.	
	
I	will	here	summarize	what	I	take	to	be	the	core	claims	advanced	on	behalf	of	a	criminology	of	
crimes	 of	 states.	 First,	 crimes	 of	 states	 have	 been	 almost	wholly	 neglected	 by	 criminologists	
during	 the	whole	 course	 of	 the	 history	 of	 the	 discipline.	 Accordingly,	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	
absence	 of	 ‘proportionality’	 in	 criminology	 as	 a	 disciplinary	 enterprise,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
disproportionate	amount	of	attention	accorded	to	crimes	of	the	powerless	as	opposed	to	crimes	
of	the	powerful.	Crimes	of	states	are	especially	significant	–	and	arguably	the	most	significant	–	
manifestations	of	crimes	of	the	powerful.	Such	crimes	are	indeed	hugely	complex	and	are	multi‐
faceted,	 but	 specifically	 criminological	 dimensions	 are	 an	 important	 part	 of	 this.	 Criminology	
itself	 is	 an	 inherently	 multi‐disciplinary	 and	 diverse	 enterprise.	 A	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	
states	 complements	 rather	 than	 displaces	 other	 disciplinary	 perspectives.	 A	 criminology	 of	
crimes	of	states	is	uniquely	qualified	to	analyze	comparatively	the	whole	spectrum	of	crime	–	as	
crime	–	and	its	control.	
	
On	monumental	and	mundane	crimes	of	states	
The	 criminological	 literature	 on	 crimes	 of	 the	 state	 disproportionally	 attends	 to	 the	 largest‐
scale	 crimes,	 especially	 genocide,	 war‐related	 crimes,	 state	 terror,	 torture,	 and	 fundamental	
denials	of	 basic	human	 rights	 (for	 example,	Chambliss,	Michalowski	 and	Kramer	2010;	Green	
and	Ward	2004;	Rothe	2009).	I	have	myself	contributed	to	this	literature,	also	with	a	focus	on	
such	crimes	(Friedrichs	1998,	2000,	2010,	2011).	And	perhaps	this	 is	as	 it	should	be,	as	these	
large‐scale	crimes	of	the	powerful	have	broad,	diffuse	consequences.		
	
Much	has	been	written	then	and	more	could	be	said	here	about	monumental	crimes	of	states.	
But	 I	 will	 here	 focus	 on	 mundane	 crimes	 of	 the	 state.	 Altogether,	 mundane	 crimes	 of	 the	
powerful	 are	 relatively	 neglected	 by	 criminologists.	 Don	 C	 Gibbons	 (1983),	 in	 an	 article	
published	 more	 than	 thirty	 years	 ago,	 addressed	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘mundane	 crime.’	 Dictionary	
meanings	of	the	term	‘mundane’	include	dull	or	routine,	and	Gibbons	pointed	out	that	a	range	of	
‘commonplace,	 low	visibility	 and	often	 relatively	 innocuous	 instances	of	 law‐breaking’	 (1983:	
214)	made	up	a	significant	portion	of	the	crime	problem	in	modern	societies.	Gibbons’s	 list	of	
mundane	crimes	includes:	drug	abuse	violations;	gambling;	offenses	against	the	family;	driving	
under	 the	 influence;	 liquor	 laws;	 drunkenness;	 disorderly	 conduct;	 and	 vagrancy.	 The	 salient	
point	here	is	that	these	commonplace,	rather	innocuous	offenses	on	the	one	hand	account	for	a	
huge	 proportion	 of	 all	 arrests	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 have	 low	 social	
visibility	 and	 many	 (but	 not	 all)	 of	 these	 mundane	 crimes	 attract	 little	 attention	 from	
criminologists.		
	
Gibbons	 notes	 that	 the	 somewhat	 parallel	 concept	 of	 ‘folk	 crime,’	 introduced	 by	 H	 Laurence	
Ross	 (1973),	 for	 offenses	 that	 lack	 social	 stigma,	 are	 significantly	 perpetrated	 by	 persons	 of	
higher	social	status,	are	exceedingly	prevalent,	and	do	not	violate	core	social	mores.	Traffic	law	
violations	 are	 the	 paradigmatic	 form	 of	 such	 crimes.	 The	 current	 author	 has	 used	 the	 term	
‘avocational	crimes’	(adapted	from	an	earlier	(1974)	invocation	by	Gil	Geis)	for	mundane	forms	
of	crime	committed	outside	of	a	vocational	context	but	parallel	to	occupational	crime	in	terms	of	
motivation	and	the	social	profiles	of	those	who	commit	them	(Friedrichs	2010).	Tax	evasion	and	
insurance	 fraud	 exemplify	 such	 crime.	 Low‐level	 occupational	 white	 collar	 crime	 –	 such	 as	
pilfering	or	small‐scale	embezzlement	by	employees	–	can	also	be	regarded	as	a	mundane	form	
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of	white	collar	crime.	In	the	recent	era	most	white	collar	crime	scholars	have	focused	upon	the	
larger‐scale	 forms	 of	 such	 crime,	 at	 least	 partly	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 an	 earlier	 disproportionate	
degree	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 more	 mundane	 forms	 of	 white	 collar	 crime	 (for	 example,	 Donald	
Cressey’s	(1953)	classic	Other	People’s	Money).	But	on	various	grounds	it	remains	important	not	
to	lose	sight	of	the	enduring	significance	of	the	mundane	forms	as	well.	
	
The	mundane	crimes	of	the	state	refers	to	the	routine	exercise	of	power	by	relatively	low‐level	
agents	of	the	state	–	civil	service	or	justice	system	bureaucrats	and	enforcement	personnel	–	in	
ways	 that	 impose	 significant	 costs	 on	 vast	 numbers	 of	 people,	 especially	 in	 developing	
countries.	Monumental	(or	monstrous)	crimes	of	states	are	most	likely	to	be	 ‘episodic,’	and	to	
occur	within	a	particular	time	frame.	The	Holocaust	was	perpetrated	over	the	course	of	several	
years.	The	Rwanda	genocide	of	1994	occurred	over	the	course	of	three	months.	Most	wars	have	
a	beginning	and	an	end.	But	mundane	crimes	of	 states	are	 far	more	 likely	 to	be	on‐going	and	
never‐ending.	 That	 such	 mundane	 crime	 in	 developing	 countries	 is	 significantly	 part	 of	 the	
legacy	of	colonialism	–	wherein	colonial	power	imposed	hugely	oppressed	bureaucratic	regimes	
on	 indigenous	 peoples	 –	 is	 one	 more	 dimension	 of	 the	 tragic	 consequences	 of	 colonialism	
(Haque	 1997;	 Sumner	 1982).	 These	 mundane	 abuses	 of	 power	 surface	 in	 relation	 to	
applications	 for	 necessary	 permits	 across	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 activities,	 from	 obtaining	 visas	 to	
peddling	licenses	to	residential	permits.		
	
The	low‐level	agents	who	perpetrate	these	offenses	can	be	characterized	as	the	‘petty	powerful.’	
Their	 power	 is	 situational,	 circumstantial,	 and	 contingent.	 In	 a	 strict	 sense,	 of	 course,	 a	
significant	percentage	of	such	abuse	occurs	when	the	petty	powerful	enforce	‘letter	of	the	law’	
requirements	 mindlessly	 and	 in	 a	 rote	 fashion,	 even	 when	 these	 requirements	 are	 clearly	
irrational,	dysfunctional	and	counterproductive.	Such	enforcement	of	laws	and	regulations	can	
be	 characterized	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘structural’	 abuse	 of	 power:	 that	 is,	 abuse	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
identifiable	harmful	consequences	even	when	the	agent	is	technically	in	compliance	with	what	
is	called	for	by	the	 law	or	regulation.	The	source	of	abuse	in	such	cases	can	be	traced	back	to	
those	 who	 create	 the	 laws	 and	 regulations	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 petty	 powerful	 may	 pride	
themselves	 in	 such	 cases	 with	 carrying	 out	 their	 job	 strictly	 in	 accordance	 with	 formal	
requirements	 and	 expectations.	 But	 for	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 petty	 powerful	 the	 intrinsic	
satisfactions	 of	 exercising	 power	 over	 other	 people,	 in	 some	 cases	 people	 with	 significantly	
higher	social	status	within	the	broader	societal	context,	is	a	core	motivating	factor,	and	a	form	of	
sadistic	 pleasure	 may	 be	 derived	 from	 compelling	 groveling	 responses	 and	 imposing	 visible	
suffering	upon	 those	 over	whom	one	has	 situational	 power.	 In	 some	 circumstances	 the	petty	
powerful	 may	 abuse	 the	 formal	 power	 they	 have	 by	 requiring	 those	 over	 whom	 they	 have	
power	 to	 go	 through	procedures	outside	 of	what	 is	 formally	 required,	 simply	 to	 demonstrate	
that	 they	 can	 exercise	 such	 power	 over	 other	 people.	 Of	 course	 the	 solicitation	 (or	 routine	
expectation)	of	bribes	to	provide	some	form	of	permit	is	a	classic	form	of	abuse	of	power	by	the	
petty	 powerful,	 and	 is	 pervasive	 (even	 institutionalized)	 across	 the	 developing	 world,	 in	
particular.	
	
It	 is	 characteristic	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 generally	 that	 the	 application	 of	 ‘crime’	 to	 the	 actions	
carried	 out	 on	 behalf	 of	 states	 or	 by	 ‘agents’	 of	 states	 is	 vigorously	 contested.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
monumental	crimes	of	states	their	status	specifically	as	 ‘crimes’	 is	now	linked	to	 international	
law	 treaties	 and	 protocols.	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 to	 address	
such	 crimes	 is	 one	 form	 of	 institutionalized	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	 specifically	 ‘criminal’	
character	 of	 genocides,	 to	 take	 the	 quintessential	 case.	 Even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 genocides	 the	
characterization	is	often	disputed	as	being	applied	to	dimensions	of	‘civil	war’	(as	in	the	case	of	
what	occurred	in	the	former	Yugoslavia).	The	application	of	 ‘crime’	to	 the	mundane,	everyday	
activities	of	agents	of	the	state	in	relation	to,	for	example,	border‐crossing	is	especially	likely	to	
be	hotly	contested	as	unwarranted.	On	the	contrary,	 these	mundane	activities	are	 likely	 to	be	
vigorously	 defended	 as	 legitimate	 and	 necessary	 activities	 in	 the	 advancement	 of	 crime	
prevention	 objectives	 of	 the	 state.	 And	 indeed,	 in	 the	 recent	 era	 a	 growing	 number	 of	
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sociologists	 –	with	 Australians	 prominent	 among	 them	 –	 have	 been	 investigating	 border	 and	
immigration	 control	 policies	 and	 practices	 as	 a	 form	 of	 crime	 (for	 example,	 Grewcock	 2009;	
Pickering	 and	 Ham	 2014).	 Sweden	 is	 a	 country	 with	 an	 enlightened	 reputation,	 but	 Isabel	
Schoultz	(2014)	has	documented	the	onerous	policies	and	practices	imposed	on	asylum	seekers	
in	that	country.	While	the	overall	policy	might	be	seen	as	a	form	of	‘monumental’	state	crime,	it	
differs	 from	 genocidal,	 war‐related	 and	 state	 torture	 initiatives	 in	 being	 on‐going	 and	 not	
episodic,	with	violence	a	more	marginal	feature	relative	to	a	vast	amount	of	mundane,	low‐level	
activity	such	as	intervention	and	deportation.	
	
The	 Arab	 Spring	 was	 apparently	 triggered	 by	 a	 mundane	 crime	 of	 power.	 A	 Tunisian	 fruit	
peddler,	Mohammed	Bouazizi,	had	been	routinely	subjected	to	abuses	by	police	empowered	to	
supervise	them.	As	one	account	notes,	‘The	cops	took	visible	pleasure	in	subjecting	the	vendors	
to	 one	 indignity	 after	 another	 –	 fining	 them,	 confiscating	 their	 scales,	 even	 ordering	 them	 to	
carry	their	stolen	fruit	to	the	cops’	car’	(Fisher	2011).	In	December	of	2010,	Bouazizi	was	once	
again	 contending	with	police	officers	who	 tried	 to	block	his	path	 and	 take	his	 fruit;	 his	uncle	
complained	to	a	police	chief.	A	policewoman	called	in	by	the	chief	was	outraged	and	returned	to	
the	marketplace	 to	confiscate	Bouazizi’s	 fruit.	A	physical	 confrontation	 followed,	and	Bouazizi	
was	slapped	on	the	face,	shamed	in	front	of	some	fifty	witnesses.	He	got	no	satisfaction	from	a	
city	hall	clerk	when	he	complained.	Bouazizi	subsequently	set	himself	on	fire	in	protest	of	this	
treatment,	and	died	three	weeks	later	in	a	hospital	burn	unit.	This	episode	is	widely	regarded	as	
setting	in	motion	the	uprisings	across	the	Arab	world.	Yes,	the	corrupt	and	oppressive	practices	
of	 autocratic	 leaders	 was	 a	 prime	 focus	 of	 these	 uprisings,	 in	 Tunisia,	 Egypt,	 Libya,	 and	
elsewhere.	 But	 surely	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 pervasive	 experience	 of	 the	
mundane,	 routine	 acts	 of	 low‐level	 government	 agents	 –	 police,	 inspectors,	 clerks	 and	 all	 the	
rest	–	provided	a	hugely	important	source	of	inspiration	for	the	uprisings.	
	
The	 author’s	 own	 interest	 in	 mundane	 crimes	 of	 states	 was	 triggered	 by	 the	 following	
experience.	 In	March,	2014,	while	 returning	 from	Cambodia	 to	Vietnam,	my	travel	companion	
(Elizabeth	Windle)	and	I	were	detained	at	the	border	for	a	total	of	eighteen	hours,	including	an	
overnight	 in	 a	 rat‐infested	 border	 hotel,	 because	 we	 had	 single‐entry	 instead	 of	 multi‐entry	
visas.	A	whole	parade	of	border	control	agents	insisted	we	had	no	recourse	but	to	travel	three	
hours	 back	 to	 Phnom	 Penh	 and	 apply	 for	 the	 proper	 new	 visas	 through	 the	 Vietnamese	
embassy.	 Had	we	 done	 so	 it	 would	 have	 almost	 certainly	 involved	 a	 process	 stretching	 over	
many	days,	would	have	potentially	cost	my	travel	companion	a	new	job	she	was	about	to	start,	
would	 have	 cost	 us	 a	 huge	 amount	 of	money	 due	 to	 non‐refundable	 air	 fares,	 and	 effectively	
would	 have	 ruined	 what	 up	 to	 then	 had	 been	 a	 fascinating	 and	 highly	 rewarding	 travel	
experience.	The	pure	irrationality	of	the	process	experienced	–	indeed,	its	profoundly	counter‐
productive	 dimensions	 in	 a	 country	 desperately	 trying	 to	 promote	 tourism	 –	 made	 a	 strong	
impression.	And	a	claim	that	this	interpretation	is	Eurocentric	and	insufficiently	attuned	to	an	
internal	cultural	logic	of	such	procedures	seems	to	me	to	be	difficult	to	sustain.		
	
We	also	had	an	opportunity	in	this	circumstance	of	witnessing	the	profound	absence	of	urgency	
upon	 the	 part	 of	 the	 border	 personnel	 in	 assisting	 two	 foreign	 tourists	 in	 distress;	 long	
breakfast	 breaks	 and	 other	 disruptions	 occurred	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 our	 trying	 to	 secure	
cooperation	 for	 getting	 across	 the	 border	 that	 day.	 The	 classically	 Kafkaesque	 dimensions	 of	
this	experience	were	dramatic.	At	one	point	a	young	woman	in	uniform	who	spoke	English	was	
brought	over	 to	 assist	 us,	 and	at	 first	 she	 smiled	at	us	 and	appear	 agreeable	 to	 doing	 so.	But	
when	she	realized	that	our	visas	were	stamped	with	‘single	entry’	rather	than	‘multi‐entry’	her	
face	turned	to	stone	and	she	informed	us	that	we	had	no	recourse	but	to	head	back	to	Phnom	
Penh	 and	 apply	 for	 the	 correct	 visa	 at	 the	 Vietnamese	 embassy	 there.	 When	 I	 urged	 her	 to	
provide	us	with	 a	 better	 alternative	 she	 said:	 ‘I’m	 sorry,	 sir,	 it	 is	 the	 law.’	 As	 a	 long‐standing	
student	of	 law	and	society	 (and	 the	author	of	a	 text	 in	 this	 realm;	 see	Friedrichs	2012)	many	
alternative	interpretations	of	where	law	might	actually	be	in	all	of	this	passed	through	my	mind	
in	this	context:	law	in	slow	motion;	 law	as	bureaucratic	 irrationality;	 law	as	an	instrument	for	
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corruption;	 law	 as	 a	 symbolic	 statement	 for	 asserting	 power;	 law	 as	 a	 means	 for	 achieving	
rational	objectives,	such	as	enhanced	security;	 law	as	a	weapon	 in	 international	relations.	We	
ultimately	 found,	 at	my	 insistence,	 a	 ‘Commander’	who	 responded	 to	 a	 plea	 to	 assist	 us	 and,	
following	a	drawn	out,	utterly	pointless	process	of	producing	all	kinds	of	documentation,	having	
photos	 taken,	and	signing	 ‘confessions’	of	our	visa‐related	mistakes,	we	were	 issued	 the	visas	
needed	 to	 re‐enter	 Vietnam.	 My	 travel	 companion	 had	 to	 communicate	 adroitly	 with	 the	
Commander	 and	 other	 border	 personnel	 drawn	 into	 this	 process	 to	 keep	 them	 on	 track	 and	
avoid	causing	any	of	them	to	‘lose	face’	in	the	process.		
	
It	 goes	 without	 saying	 that	 our	 ‘suffering’	 in	 this	 episode	 was	 minuscule	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
suffering	 of	 millions	 of	 people,	 disproportionately	 in	 developing	 countries,	 who	 endure	 such	
obstructionist	 bureaucratic	 procedures	 over	 days,	weeks,	months,	 and	 even	 years,	 in	 seeking	
‘permits’	 for	 a	 range	 of	 essential	 –	 even	 life‐sustaining	 –	 activities.	 Furthermore,	 I	 have	 been	
correctly	informed	that	American	border	personnel	are	especially	strict	and	inflexible	on	these	
kinds	of	‘irregularities’	involving	would‐be	foreign	visitors.	But	from	the	vantage	point	of	people	
in	the	developing	countries,	such	mundane	crimes	are	hugely	consequential.	
	
In	conclusion	on	this	section	I	should	be	clear:	Monumental	crimes	of	states	should	remain	the	
highest	 priority	 focus	 for	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states.	 But	 I	 have	 suggested	 here	 that	
mundane	crimes	of	states	may	be	unjustly	neglected	and	warrant	some	significant	attention	–	as	
long	as	such	crimes	don’t	become	the	primary	focus	of	a	criminology	of	crimes	of	states.		
	
On	mislabeled	and	miscalculated	crimes	of	states	
On	 the	matter	 of	what	 I	 characterize	here	 as	mislabeled	 crimes	of	 states,	 I	 can	be	 fairly	brief.	
When	the	term	state	crime	–	or	crimes	of	a	state	–	is	invoked,	there	is	sometimes	considerable	
confusion	on	exactly	what	 is	 being	 addressed.	 I	will	not	here	address	 in	 substance	 the	 issues	
relating	to	defining	the	term	‘state’	(but	see	Friedrichs	and	Rothe	2014).	Briefly,	however,	if	we	
invoke	the	term	state	crime	it	is	not	always	clear	whether	actions	of	the	state	leadership,	of	state	
bureaucrats,	 other	 state‐related	 actors,	 or	 some	 complex	mix	 of	 these,	 is	 involved.	 Clarity	 in	
terms	 of	 who	 specifically	 acts,	 and	 who	 specifically	 benefits,	 from	 the	 crimes	 in	 question,	 is	
needed.	 Parallel	 issues	 arise	 in	 relation	 to	 state‐corporate	 crime,	 and	 crimes	 of	 globalization	
(Friedrichs	and	Rothe	2014;	Rothe	and	Friedrichs	2015).	Crimes	of	states	may	be	 ‘mislabeled’	
when	 it	 is	unclear	whether	 the	crimes	of	states	are	carried	out	on	behalf	of	 the	state,	broadly	
conceived,	or	a	specific	government	regime;	when	the	crimes	in	question	are	initiated	by	those	
at	the	top,	those	at	the	bottom,	or	those	somewhere	in‐between	in	the	state	hierarchy	of	power;	
when	 the	 crimes	 in	 question	 are	 purely	 political,	 are	 deeply	 intertwined	 with	 corporate	 or	
finance	sector	entities,	or	when	still	other	non‐state	parties	are	involved;	and	when	the	crimes	
in	question	are	carried	out	overtly,	with	full‐fledged	rationales,	or	are	carried	out	covertly,	and	
concealed	from	public	knowledge.	
	
In	relation	to	miscalculated	crimes	of	states	I	will	re‐introduce	a	concern	that	I	originally	raised	
in	 the	Onati	 Symposium	on	Crimes	of	 States	 (Friedrichs	2010).	 In	 short	 order,	 the	 concern	 is	
with	 a	 disproportionate	 retrospective	 focus	 of	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states.	 There	 is	
relatively	 less	attention	 to	current	and	prospective	crimes	of	 states.	Accordingly,	 I	 called	 for	 a	
prospective	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states,	 with	 a	 proportionately	 greater	 focus	 on	 current,	
emerging,	and	possible	future	momentous	crimes	of	states,	and	ideally	the	policies	and	practices	
that	would	be	best	 able	 to	 contain	 or	deflect	 such	 crimes.	 I	 have	 earlier	 invoked	 the	 singular	
case	of	 the	Holocaust,	 and	my	own	 family	 connection	with	 this	paradigmatic	 crime	of	 a	 state,	
and	my	publishing	on	this	topic	(Friedrichs	2000).	I	have	for	many	years	co‐taught	a	course	on	
the	Holocaust.	Accordingly,	 I	would	be	an	unlikely	candidate	 for	belittling	 its	 significance	and	
on‐going	importance.	But	for	some	time	I	have	also	experienced	some	dimension	of	unease	with	
the	 never‐ending	 outpouring	 of	 books,	 articles,	 films,	 plays,	 and	 so	 forth	 focused	 on	 the	
Holocaust,	pejoratively	characterized	as	 ‘the	Holocaust	 industry.’	Heading	 into	the	Holocaust	–	
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in	 the	 1920s	 and	 1930s	 –	 there	 was	 very	 little	 attention	 from	 most	 academics,	 including	
criminologists,	 about	 those	 dimensions	 of	 the	 Nazi	 program	 that	 could	 produce	 such	 an	
outcome.	True,	in	some	sense,	the	Holocaust	was	literally	unimaginable.		
	
I	 recalling	 wondering,	 at	 an	 earlier	 time,	 what	 were	 German	 (and	 American)	 criminologists	
doing	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	Holocaust?	Some	years	ago	the	historian	Richard	Wetzell	(2000),	in	
Inventing	 the	 Criminal,	 addressed	 this	 question.	 Unsurprisingly,	 they	 were	 almost	 wholly	
focused	on	conventional	offenders,	and	quite	a	number	of	German	criminologists	 (but	not	all)	
embraced	 a	 version	 of	 the	 Lombrosian	 ‘born	 criminal’	 thesis.	 This	 focus	 on	 biogenetic	
dimensions	 of	 criminality	 and	 on	 eugenics	 as	 one	 constructive	 response	 to	 preventing	 crime	
was	of	course	compatible	with	the	Nazi	outlook	on	crime.	American	criminologists	during	this	
time	 were	 also	 overwhelming	 focused	 on	 conventional	 offenders,	 with	 poverty	 as	 one	
prominent	 explanation	 for	 crime.	 Edwin	 Sutherland	 (1940),	 in	 1939,	 famously	 called	 for	
attention	to	white	collar	crime.	But	on	the	threshold	of	the	initiation	of	the	monumental	crime	of	
the	Holocaust	Sutherland	did	not	express	any	interest	in	such	crime:	that	is,	the	crime	of	states.		
	
Criminologists	 today,	 including	 American	 criminologists,	 remain	 focused	 primarily	 on	
conventional	 crime	and	 its	 control,	 and	moreover	on	 crime	 that	 is	occurring	or	has	occurred.	
There	are	some	exceptions	here	with	at	least	some	criminologists	of	crimes	of	states	addressing	
crimes	 with	 major	 prospective	 dimensions.	 David	 Kauzlarich	 and	 Ronald	 Kramer’s	 (1998)	
Crimes	 of	 the	 American	 Nuclear	 State	 addresses	 a	 much‐neglected	 but	 potentially	 hugely	
consequential	 form	of	 crime,	 that	 involving	nuclear	 energy	 and	nuclear	weapons.	Many	years	
earlier	(Friedrichs	1985),	I	myself	had	addressed	the	threat	of	nuclear	war	as	a	criminological	
issue.	My	article	was	inspired	by	Richard	Harding’s	(1983)	Presidential	address,	in	1982,	to	the	
Criminology	 Section	 of	 the	 Australian/New	 Zealand	 AAS,	 entitled	 ‘Nuclear	 Energy	 and	 the	
Destiny	 of	Mankind	 –	 Some	 Criminological	 Perspectives’.	 I	 believe	 that	 Harding	was	 the	 first	
criminologist	to	address	the	threat	of	nuclear	war	as	a	criminological	issue.		
	
More	recently,	a	growing	number	of	criminologists	have	addressed	environmental	crimes,	not	
only	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 present	 manifestations	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 threat	 to	 long‐term	
sustainability.	One	recent	book	specifically	addresses	climate	change	and	global	warming	as	a	
criminological	 issue	 (White	 2012).	 The	 failure	 to	 adopt	 policies	 and	 practices	 that	 would	
minimize	 the	 harmful	 consequences	 of	 global	 warming	 may	 well	 at	 some	 future	 time	 be	
regarded	 as	 a	 crime	 of	 monumental	 consequences.	 And	 the	 increasingly	 oligarchic	 and	
plutocratic	 character	 of	 many	 states	 across	 the	 globe	 has	 already	 had	 a	 huge	 effect	 on	 the	
expanding	economic	inequality	and	going	forward	can	be	seen	as	promoting	massive,	on‐going	
theft	of	the	collective	wealth	of	the	people	of	many	different	countries.	The	call	for	a	prospective	
criminology	of	crimes	of	states	is	a	call	for	a	criminology	that	directs	more	attention	to	emerging	
crimes	 of	 states,	 that	 identifies	 conditions	 which	 nurture	 and	 foster	 these	 crimes,	 and	 that	
identifies	policies	and	practices	that	are	optimal	for	resisting	and	preventing	such	crime.	
	
Concluding	comments	
A	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 is	 today	 a	 vigorous	 and	 expanding	 enterprise.	 But	 there	 is	
much	work	to	be	done.	I	will	here	identify	a	motley	list	of	some	issues	that	might	constitute	part	
of	 the	 agenda	 for	 this	 enterprise	 going	 forward,	 with	 some	 being	 of	 internal	 professional	
interest	and	some	having	broad	consequences	within	the	larger	world.		
	
For	graduate	students	and	student	faculty	who	choose	to	specialize	in	crimes	of	states,	what	is	
the	 perceived	 impact	 on	 job	 and	 career	 options?	 I	 don’t	 believe	 this	 has	 been	 explored	
empirically.	 What	 is	 the	 most	 constructive	 response	 to	 the	 resistance	 of	 mainstream	
criminology	journals	to	publishing	manuscripts	on	crimes	of	states?	Are	critical	or	interpretive	
approaches	 within	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 in	 relation	 to	 positivistic	 approaches	
necessarily	 contradictory,	 or	 can	 they	 be	 complementary?	 What	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 the	
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demonstrable	growth	of	distrust	in	governments	for	crimes	of	states?	What	are	the	implications	
of	the	erosion	of	economic	growth	and	wealth	for	crimes	of	states?	
	
In	 sum,	 I	 have	 here	 called	 for	 a	 rethinking	 of	 a	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 so	 that	 it	 is	
positioned	to	have	an	optimal	impact	both	within	the	academic	milieu	and	in	the	larger	world.	I	
have	 suggested	 that	 the	 formulation	 of	 an	 agenda	 of	 viable	 and	 worthwhile	 projects	 for	 an	
evolving	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states	 is	 one	 starting	 point	 for	 such	 a	 recasting	 of	 this	
enterprise.	
	
	
	
Correspondence:	 David	 O	 Friedrichs,	 Distinguished	 Professor	 of	 Sociology,	 Criminal	 Justice	 &	
Criminology,	University	of	Scranton,	310	Jefferson	Avenue,	Scranton,	Pennsylvania	18510‐4605,	
USA.	Email:	david.friedrichs@scranton.edu	
	
	
	
Please	cite	this	article	as:	
Friedrichs	DO	 (2015)	Rethinking	 the	 criminology	 of	 crimes	 of	 states:	Monumental,	mundane,	
mislabeled	 and	 miscalculated	 crimes.	 International	 Journal	 for	 Crime,	 Justice	 and	 Social	
Democracy	4(4):	106‐119.	DOI:	10.5204/ijcjsd.v3i2.266.	
	
	This	work	is	licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution	4.0	Licence.	As	an	
open	access	 journal,	articles	are	 free	 to	use,	with	proper	attribution,	 in	educational	and	other	
non‐commercial	settings.	ISSN:	2202‐8005	
	
	
	
References	
Barak	G	(1991)	Crimes	by	the	Capitalist	State.	Albany,	New	York:	State	University	of	New	York	
Press.	
Carrier	N	and	Park	A	(2013)	On	an	entrepreneurial	criminology	of	mass	political	violence.	
Crime,	Law	and	Social	Change	60(3):	297‐317.	DOI:	10.1007/s10611‐013‐9452‐z.		
Chambliss	WJ	(1989)	State‐organized	crime.	Criminology	27(2):	183‐208.	
Chambliss	WJ,	Michalowski	R	and	Kramer	RC	(eds)	(2010)	State	Crime	in	the	Global	Age.	
Cullompton,	United	Kingdom:	Willan.	
Chambliss	WJ	and	Moloney	C	(eds)	(2015)	State	Crime,	Volumes	I‐IV.	London:	Routledge.	
Cohen	S	(2001)	States	of	Denial:	Knowing	about	Atrocities	and	Suffering.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press.	
Cressey	DB	(1953)	Other	People’s	Money.	Glencoe,	Illinois:	Free	Press.	
Fisher	M	(2011)	In	Tunisia,	act	of	one	fruit	vendor	unleashes	wave	of	revolution	through	the	
Arab	world.	The	Washington	Post,	27	March:	1.	
Friedrichs	DO	(1981)	The	problem	of	reconciling	divergent	perspectives	on	urban	crime:	
Personal	experience,	social	ideology	and	scholarly	research.	Qualitative	Sociology	4(3):	217‐
228.	DOI:	10.1007/BF00988378.	
Friedrichs	DO	(1985)	The	nuclear	arms	issue	and	the	field	of	criminal	justice.	The	Justice	
Professional	1(1):	5‐9.	
Friedrichs	DO	(1996)	Governmental	crime,	Hitler,	and	white	collar	crime:	A	problematic	
relationship.	Caribbean	Journal	of	Criminology	and	Social	Psychology	1(2):	351‐366.		
Friedrichs	DO	(ed.)	(1998)	State	Crime,	Volumes	I	and	II.	Aldershot,	United	Kingdom:	Ashgate.	
David	O	Friedrichs:	Rethinking	the	Criminology	of	Crimes	of	States	
IJCJ&SD									118	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2015	4(4)	
Friedrichs	DO	(2000)	The	crime	of	the	century?	The	case	for	the	Holocaust.	Crime,	Law	and	
Social	Change	34(1):	21‐41.	DOI:	10.1023/A:1008322402290.	
Friedrichs	DO	(2010)	Toward	a	prospective	criminology	of	state	crime.	In	Chambliss	WJ	
Michalowski	R	and	Kramer	RC	(eds)	State	Crime	in	the	Global	Age:	67‐80.	Cullompton,	United	
Kingdom:	Willan.	
Friedrichs	DO	(2011)	The	crime	of	the	last	century	–	and	of	this	century?	In	Rothe	DL	and	
Mullins	CW	(eds)	State	Crime:	Current	Perspectives:	49‐67.	New	Brunswick,	New	Jersey:	
Rutgers	University	Press.	
Friedrichs	DO	(2012)	Law	in	Our	Lives:	An	Introduction,	3rd	edn.	New	York:	Oxford	University	
Press.	
Friedrichs	DO	(2015)	Crimes	of	the	powerful	and	the	definition	of	crime.	In	Barak	G	(ed.)	The	
Routledge	International	Handbook	of	the	Crimes	of	the	Powerful:	39‐49.	London:	Routledge.	
Friedrichs	DO	and	Rothe	DL	(2014)	State‐corporate	crime	and	major	financial	institutions:	
Interrogating	an	absence.	State	Crime	Journal	3(2):	146‐163.	DOI:	
10.13169/statecrime.3.2.0146.	
Geis	G	(1974)	Avocational	crime.	In	Glaser	D	(ed.)	Handbook	of	Criminology:	273‐298.	New	York:	
Rand	McNally.	
Gibbons	D	(1983)	Mundane	Crime.	Crime	&	Delinquency	29(2):	213‐227.	DOI:	
10.1177/001112878302900202.	
Green	P	and	Ward	T	(2004)	State	Crime:	Governments,	Violence	and	Corruption.	London:	Pluto	
Press.	
Grewcock	M	(2009)	Border	Crimes:	Australia’s	War	on	Illicit	Migrants.	Sydney:	Institute	Of	
Criminology	Press.	
Haque	MS	(1997)	Incongruity	between	bureaucracy	and	society	in	developing	nations:	A	
Critique.	Peace	&	Change	22(4):	432‐462.	DOI:	10.1111/0149‐0508.00061.		
Harding	R	(1983)	Nuclear	energy	and	the	destination	of	mankind.	Australian	and	New	Zealand	
Journal	of	Criminology	16(June):	81‐92.	
Kauzlarich	D	and	Kramer	RC	(1998)	Crimes	of	the	American	Nuclear	State:	At	Home	and	Abroad.	
Boston:	Northeastern	University	Press.	
Kulish	N	(2008)	75	years	after	Hitler’s	ascent	a	Germany	that	won’t	forget.	New	York	Times,	29J	
January:	A1.	
McNamara,	RS	(1995)	In	Retrospect:	The	Tragedy	and	Lessons	of	Vietnam.	New	York:	Times	
Books.	
Pickering	S	and	Ham	J	(eds)	(2014)	The	Routledge	Handbook	on	Crime	and	International	
Migration.	London:	Routledge.	
Proal	L	(1898)	Political	Crime.	New	York:	D	Appleton	&	Co.	
Ross	HL	(1973)	Folk	crime	evisited.	Criminology	11(1):	41‐85.	DOI:	10.1111/j.1745‐
9125.1973.tb00587.x.		
Ross	JI	(1995)	Controlling	State	Crime:	An	Introduction.	New	York:	Garland.	
Rothe	DL	(2009)	State	Criminality:	The	Crime	of	All	Crimes.	Lanham,	Maryland:	Lexington	Books.	
Rothe	DL	and	Friedrichs	DO	(2015)	Crimes	of	Globalization.	London:	Routledge.	
Rothe	DL	and	Mullins	CW	(2011)	State	Crime:	Current	Perspectives.	New	Brunswick,	New	Jersey:	
Rutgers	University	Press.	
Schoultz	I	(2014)	Seeking	asylum	and	residence	permits	in	Sweden:	Denial,	acknowledgment,	
and	bureaucratic	legitimacy.	Critical	Criminology	22:	219‐235.	DOI	10.1007/s10612‐013‐
9206‐3.	
David	O	Friedrichs:	Rethinking	the	Criminology	of	Crimes	of	States	
IJCJ&SD									119	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2015	4(4)	
Schwendinger	H	and	Schwendinger	J	(1970)	Defenders	of	order	or	guardians	of	human	rights?	
Issues	in	Criminology	5(2):	123‐158.	
Smeulers	A	and	Haveman	R	(eds)	(2008)	Supranational	Criminology:	Towards	a	Criminology	of	
International	Crime.	Antwerp:	Intersentia.	
Sumner	C	(1982)	Crime,	Justice,	and	Underdevelopment.	London:	Heinemann.	
Sutherland	EH	(1940)	White‐collar	criminality.	American	Sociological	Review	5(1):	1‐12.	
Turk	A	(1982)	Political	Criminality:	The	Defiance	and	Defense	of	Authority.	Beverly	Hills,	
California:	Sage.	
Wetzell	R	(2000)	Inventing	the	Criminal:	A	History	of	Germany	Criminology,	1880‐1945.	Chapel	
Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press.	
White	R	(ed.)	(2012)	Climate	Change	from	a	Criminological	Perspective.	New	York:	Springer.	
	
